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THE TALE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIVISMS
AT THE COLD WAR’S END
VENDULKA KUBÁLKOVÁ
Constructivism as an approach to IR and Soviet “new thinking” as a
phenomenon of the final years of the cold war barely crossed paths
since constructivism was coming into existence as an approach just as
the other, “new thinking”, together with its main author, Mikhail
Gorbachev, were about to exit international relations. Soviet “new
thinking” is associated with Gorbachev’s tenure of office as the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
This ran from the mid 1980s till the disintegration of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Nicholas Onuf introduced constructivism in his book
World of Our Making in 1989 and it was only in 1992, a year after
the formal dissolution of the USSR, that Alexander Wendt referred
to “new thinking” in his article “Anarchy is What States Make of it”
as “one of the most important phenomena in [recent] world politics”
(Wendt 1992, 450). It is in this same article that he also used the term
constructivism, a term he borrowed from Onuf. Other, freshly convert-
ed constructivists followed in Wendt’s footsteps and, as evidence of
the strength of their new approach, they often used “the DNA of the
deceased”: Soviet “new thinking” and other artifacts and stories
related to the cold war, which—with its main protagonist gone—was
over. “New thinking” figures prominently again in Wendt’s theore-
6 E
THE TALE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIVISMS AT THE COLD WAR’S END
tical book on constructivism, where it is probably the empirical case
that he handles in a more sustained manner and devotes to it more
time than to any other cases or examples (Wendt, 1999).
There are multiple ironies here. Whilst the USSR and its bloc existed
Soviet thinking, new or otherwise—was never a topic, certainly not as
“thinking” at any rate, since it could not count as thinking. The posi-
tivist ontological and epistemological premises of the Western social
sciences decreed it possible to have only one truthful and accurate
representation of objective reality. Anything contradicting that truth
simply could not be “thinking. “: it had to be intellectually inferior
and deficient construct, a bunch of fabrications, distortions and or ex
post facto justifications–in short, an ideology, concocted not to shed
light on reality but to fool millions of Soviet and East European citizens
who, by implication, must have been intellectually inferior not to see
through it.
Having been raised myself as a “Soviet thinker,” that is, having
not known anything else for the first half of my life other than what
was taught at the Soviet empire’s Prague Charles University outpost,
and having then studied in the West after fleeing there, I was never
able to accept either of the corollaries of the positivist view. I could
never accept that the thinking I was raised in was not thinking or that
we were all fools. My university teachers in particular were not fools.
Quite the contrary, they showed a great deal of personal courage and
ex cathedra heroism, a quality we academics in the West are never called
upon to demonstrate. While the Soviet Union was in existence I argued
this point frequently and in vain in a number of my works on Soviet
“new thinking” (particularly in a book entitled Thinking New About
Soviet New Thinking [1989a]) and other works dealing with Soviet
thinking in general (e.g., Kubálková and Cruickshank, 1977, 1978,
1980, 1980a, 1981, 1981a, 1983, 1985, 1985a, 1989, 1989a, and
Kubálková, 1979, 1990, 1994).
Another irony in the rediscovery of “new thinking” as a topic is
that it is not brought before us by former Sovietologists, but by IR
theorists for whom Soviet “new thinking” has become something of
a cause celebre to demonstrate the need for a constructivist approach
to the post-cold war era. What is most ironic, however, is that the
Wendtean form of constructivism which in this paper I call “soft”
constructivism, gets Soviet new thinking wrong. This may be of little
consequence as far as the history of the Soviet Union is concerned.
However, the inability of the Wendtean constructivism to handle “new
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thinking” and presenting it as a litmus test of the prowess of soft
constructivism becomes serious if this form of constructivism is to be
the response that IR scholars in the US make to the post cold war
world.
That this may happen is not so difficult to imagine if we consider
how constructivism has become elevated to one of the three main IR
approaches. Steven Walt, for example, actually goes so far as to replace
globalist, dependencia, neomarxist, and World System approaches
with constructivist one, next to realist and liberal approaches and clearly
he refers mainly to soft constructivism. (Walt, 1998, 38). The elevation
to prominence of this brand of constructivism, replacing in the process
an entire tradition, is certainly an indication of how seriously cons-
tructivism is treated, or how badly it is perceived to be needed.
It would seem that the mainstream American IR discipline made
three changes to adjust to the blunders of failing the “end of the cold
war” test. All three are related to constructivism, and all three-under-
score the interpretation of mainly soft constructivism designated as
the IR approach to the post cold war era. First, there was recognition
that such phenomena as Soviet “new thinking” might have held some
clues missed by the approaches extant at the time of the Soviet Union’s
unraveling and—equally importantly—that occurrences of similar
phenomena might not be uncommon after the cold war’s end. Thus
a bundle of new themes were added to the list of IR concerns. All of
them have to do with what two prominent neoliberal writers called
“ideational” factors (Keohane, Goldstein, 1993), the quirkish develop-
ments of the “agent” in the juxtaposition of agent and structure that
Wendt introduced the IR audience to in 1987. All these terms are to
do with the recognition of the “voluntaristic,” undetermined, aspect
of IR, in which people, rather than material forces, play a role. The
new IR topics, which became soon the biggest and most popular IR
topics of the post cold war era, have been identity, intersubjectivity,
meaning, motivation, interest, and culture. These happen to be the
main topics of the soft constructivism.
The second adjustment is closely related. Namely, recognition that
topics such as “new thinking” escaped the attention of both foreign
policy analysis (FPA) and international politics (IP) as they were
originally conceived. This has led to the creation of a new home for
constructivism in “national security studies,” a field straddling and
combining elements of both FPA and IP without having to redefine
either of them (Katzenstein, 1996). Finally, the third change is—as I
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already mentioned—the elevation of constructivism to one of the
three main approaches to IR. It amounts to recognition that large
number of topics and concerns were unaccounted for in the gamut
of topics covered in the main approaches to IR whose names even
undergraduates had to learn and recite. Thus the trio realism, pluralism
and globalism, more recently relabeled as neorealism, neoliberalism
and globalism, have been changed to read neorealism, neoliberalism
and constructivism.
For all practical purposes it would appear that this triple change
wraps up the Third Debate, at least for the mainstream. Unrelated to
the demise of the cold war, the Third Debate could be said to have
prepared the ground for this triple change. Perhaps over-prepared is
the word since many IR scholars, under the influence of Third Debate
themes and expectations, might be reading more into these changes
than they warrant.
The triple change I describe is only tenuously related to the Third
Debate. None of these changes is antipositivist whilst the Third Debate
was mainly an assault on positivism in the IR discipline. The non-
positivist glimpses that most versions of soft constructivism provide
are fleeting at best and the positivist framework has been never
seriously challenged. It is as if for a few brief moments, the traffic
swung to the left, only to return back straightaway to the right side
of the road. Needless to say all of the other traffic has kept driving
all the time or most of the time on the right.
All of this would be of little consequence if it were not for one
detail, namely, that we do not have one constructivism but several.
There is the post cold war soft constructivism encouraged and elevated
by the academic politics of the aftermath of that discipline’s glaring
failure to have explained let alone anticipated the end of the cold war.
And there are other constructivisms, which emerged out of the Third,
that is the post-positivist, Debate in the IR discipline. The leaders of
the mainstream have forewarned that the test as to which version of
constructivism will make it will be played out in positivist terms, that
is on the grounds of empirical utility, and this is the test we face now.
Postmodern constructivists, the other form of constructivism that
emerged out of the Third Debate, however disqualify themselves from
such a contest based upon their anti-foundationalist claim denying that
discourses have a reality behind them to be checked against. Rule-
oriented constructivism accepts the challenge.
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This paper is the tale of two constructivisms, the soft and the rule
oriented, based on the work of Onuf (1989) and the Miami Theory
Group (1998, 2001): the one that emerged from the post cold war
adjustment of the IR mainstream and the other—a product of the
Third Debate. The paper is the tale of these two constructivisms but
also of the different tales that they tell about Soviet “new thinking.”
The paper is divided into two parts. First, I summarize the “verdict”
as to what was the Soviet “new thinking” and what role it played in
the ending of the cold war by neorealist and Sovietological approaches.
I then proceed to the soft constructivism. I note that certainly if the
example of the Soviet “new thinking” is anything to go by, the soft
constructivism is very similar to the neoliberal approach in its con-
clusions concerning “new thinking.” Insofar as the latter is compatible
with the neorealist approach as well, then mainstream constructivism,
I will argue, is nothing more than mainstream IR adapted for the post
cold war era. To use Ruggie’s formula combining the two “neo”s into
one, we have a utilitarian approach modified by a dose of voluntarism.
Second, I show the differences in the treatment of the same
Soviet “new thinking” by constructivists of the rule oriented variety.
Here I use mainly my own work on “new thinking” based on the
actual Soviet discourse. This paper is based on the forthcoming
volume I have edited in the M. E. Sharpe series “International Relations
in a Constructed World” of which Nicholas Onuf and myself are
academic series editors. The book to be called A Constructivist Hand-
book for Foreign Policy and International Relations will be published
in 2001 and it contains some of the basic concepts on which this
paper relies.
Triumphalism and its neoliberal
and soft constructivist modifications
If Wendt is right in saying that Soviet “new thinking” was one of the
most important phenomena of our time how is it that only a few
years before Wendt made that statement, his IR colleagues thought
that they could ignore it?
As an “important phenomenon”, to use Wendt’s words, “new
thinking” should have been noted in a large number of academic
disciplines however, particularly if it were not quite clear what it was:
Sovietology, comparative communism, a history of the cold war, foreign
policy analysis, the foreign policy of the US, of the USSR, political
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theory (which should have noted a change in Soviet ideology), or
theory of International Relations. It was noted in some, evaded in
others and in most of them misunderstood.
Neorealism
The problem with the neorealist IR position, the dominant approach
to IR at the time of the Soviet new thinking, is that it makes two
static “snapshots” of the world, one before and one after the collapse
of the USSR. It has no way of connecting the two.
Take the snapshot of Gorbachev at the helm of the USSR. No
matter what he might have said and expressed in his “new thinking”,
to IR theorists, it did not matter. The Cold War was a bipolar structure,
and this determined the Soviet Union’s interests in a way that could
not be overridden by any amount of talk and wishful thinking. Neo-
realism, by definition, shuts out consideration of domestic features of
individual states, relegating them to the theoretical margins. Accord-
ing to Kenneth Waltz’s famous Theory of International Politics (1979)
the world ran to the design which he had discovered. As he put it,
if there is a theory of IP, the balance of power it is. What then could
Soviet “new thinking” possibly mean to neorealists? The answer is
“nothing.” When I presented a paper at Berkeley about Soviet “new
thinking” in the presence of Kenneth Waltz in 1988 he agreed that
“new thinking” “looked like” a theory of IR. No theory however can
“wish away” Newton’s law of gravity and make objects fall upwards
instead of downwards. Neorealists cannot possibly see how any amount
of thinking could alter the material structure (the cold war) under
which a Gorbachev had to make his rational choices.
A systemic change/transformation as momentous as the end of
the cold war was deemed by neorealists at any rate, impossible short
of superpower war (Lebow and Risse Kappen, p. I) By the logic of
Hobbesean anarchy and the logic of the balance of power, exogenously
imposed on the USA as well as the Soviet Union, Gorbachev had to
do everything he could to protect the Soviet position in the structure
as defined by Waltz. He should have balanced, formed alliances, and
tried to regain his country’s strength. Instead, the Soviet Union literally
gave away its territorial holdings, the geopolitical acquisitions of the
Second World War, and actively encouraged East European satellites
to go their own way. For the first time since the Sino-Soviet split a
Soviet leader got on well with a Chinese leader. The newly fashioned
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Sino-Soviet entente and alliance was not put to the use that it should
have been in realist terms. The Soviet Union made passes at the United
States, but not of the sort expected by realists. Somehow, Gorbachev
“defied” or tried to defy, the exogenous forces under which he was
deemed to be laboring.
Take a second neorealist snapshot, this time of the end of the
cold war after the collapse of the USSR. The ex post facto explana-
tion of this collapse is that internal problems weakened the Soviet
Union to the point that they changed the structure of bipolarity. Thus
the conclusion: ”we have won.” A realist of Morgenthau’s variety
might have argued that Gorbachev paid the price of his irrational
behavior, and so did the Soviet Union (for which Russians now hate
him!) Neorealism however makes no place for irrational behavior.
Thus the leap between the two snapshots and to the conclusion of
claiming victory of this terminal contest, though realists were not
fully aware at the time that the contest was actually terminal!
The message is very important though, since it serves to legitimize
the hegemonic unipolar world structure that resulted with its single
superpower and its broad mandate for NATO activities, as some authors
claim, in the resultant world.
Sovietology
What was “new thinking” to a positivist, liberal, “détente” Sovietologist
on whose perspective depended the FPA What did they study? How
and why had Gorbachev changed his foreign policy and what, if
anything, had Soviet “new thinking” to do with it?
A great deal was written on Soviet new thinking at the same time
as it came into existence. There were different definitions of what “new
thinking” meant, even in those studies specifically dedicated to its analy-
sis in the US, UK, Germany and China (see for example, Berner and
Dahm, 1987/88; Dallin, 1987; Evangelista, 1987; Glickham, 1986;
Legvold, 1988a, 1988b; Light, 1987a, 1988; Meissner, 1986; Miller,
1988; Sestanovich, 1988; Shenfield, 1987; Snyder, 1987/88; Valkenier,
1987; Wettig, 1987; Zhi and Zhang, 1988). No Sovietologist disputed
that something had changed but the identifying what that something
was remained constrained by the positivist premises on which main-
stream Sovietology, as well as mainstream IR studies, had become based.
Simply put, and consistent with positivist premises, “new think-
ing” seemed to be the new style of a new broom. Gorbachev was
12 E
THE TALE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIVISMS AT THE COLD WAR’S END
new. The Sovietologists meticulously listed all of the ways in which
Gorbachev represented a break from the “old style,” i.e. from the
“old thinking” of the Brezhnev variety. He was much younger, he
changed the entire diplomatic establishment, and he traveled a great
deal (his geriatric three predecessors, Brezhnev, Chernenko and
Andropov, had all died in office and were too elderly to travel.) Not
only did he travel but also he took his wife with him, unlike his pre-
decessors, whose wives made their first appearances at their husbands’
funerals. Gorbachev and his wife looked, dressed, and sounded like
Westerners.
There were Sovietologists who noted that Soviet new thinking
consisted of a number of points or principles. These were differently
identified, however. Thus Margot Light, for example listed six main
points (1988); Alexander Dallin four (1987), Charles Glickham about
seven (1986) and Jack Snyder (1987/88) none. Legvold, meanwhile,
found “new thinking” to mean changed attitudes in four regards,
1. security, 2. interdependence, 3. the Third World, and 4. socialist states
(1988).
According to Shestanovich “new thinking” meant “devaluation of
ideological precepts, a more complacent assessment of outside threats,
a re-examination of national interests and heavier stress on global
‘common’ interests, a cap on resource commitments, a search for less
expensive policy instruments, a more flexible and less demanding stance
in negotiations, and an arms-length attitude toward friends in need
and an insistence that they do more to help themselves, avoidance of
actions that adversaries can treat as provocations, and so forth”
(1988, 4). Characteristically both Legvold and Shestanovich used their
own words in formulating and reformulating what “new thinking”
and its principles were, and not the words of any Soviet writer or
spokesman.
Since there was in the West no agreement about the content of
Soviet “new thinking,” any IR expert could borrow whatever he wanted.
Thus “new thinking” was seen not only as a new foreign policy style
but also as a new strategic doctrine. The foreign policy analysts placed
whatever these principles might have been in the context provided by
the FPA and by the neorealist understanding of the constraints under




After the USSR’s collapse: neoliberal institutionalism,
mainstream constructivism and the “new thinking”
Once the Cold War had ended and the dust had settled, it became
obvious just how big a social change the world had undergone. Scholar
after scholar expressed surprise: Why would the USSR give up the
Brezhnev Doctrine and let East Europe go? Why let the Warsaw Pact
disintegrate when under the same strategic conditions earlier on it
would never have considered doing so, asks Peter Katzenstein.
(Katzenstein, 1996). Many IR scholars with liberal leanings suspected
that the key issues were out of the conceptual reach of neorealism and
even of liberalism, and that what went on in the USSR under the
label of “new thinking” might hold the clue.
Two germinal pieces concerning these questions, and separated
by only one year when they appeared were both obviously inspired by
the end of the cold war. Wendt wrote his famous constructivist article
in 1992 (Wendt, 1992). Another book of innovations, this time neo-
liberal institutionalist, came out had on the heels of Wendt’s piece,
in 1993, namely a book entitled Ideas in Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Insti-
tutions, and Political Change (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) Adding
to this literature is Katzenstein’s collection of case studies published
in 1996 (Katzenstein, ed., 1996). There followed a number of other
studies, which used one or other of these frameworks or fused the
two making it difficult to distinguish them. In addition to the chapter
on Soviet “new thinking” by Herman (in Katzenstein, 1996) I also
refer to the book on the subject by Checkel (1997) and to the col-
lection of essays dedicated to the Soviet “new thinking” inspired by
either neoliberalism or constructivism and edited by Lebow and Risse
Kappen (1995). Wendt returns to “new thinking” again in his 1999
book.
How did scholars argue their new case? “Reigning realist and
liberal explanations cannot adequately account for ’new thinking’’s
revolutionary character,” Herman says, for example. Realism, he con-
tinues, is too preoccupied with material capabilities, the structural
constraints on political actors. Liberalism, too, marginalizes the “social
processes that spawned the core ideas of mature New Thinking.”
(Herman, 1996, 272) How do we suddenly know however, that “new
thinking,” (read, the “new style” of the “new broom”) was so seemingly
“revolutionary,” and that it had passed through stages enabling it to
“mature?”
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Most of authors of this genre explicitly state that their wish is not
to contradict but to complement the liberalist and realist approaches.
The impression one gets is that they want to complement/ qualify
the rather awkwardly argued neorealist argument that “we have won”
the cold war. Neorealists, as I have tried to show in the previous section,
did not, or could not, shed light on how this process of social change
became possible.
What then do the two approaches identified above conclude was
the nature of “new thinking” and its role in ending the cold war and
in the collapse of the Soviet Union? Both neoliberal institutionalists
and constructivists take away some of the glory of a US victory in the
cold war claimed by neorealists, and/or they spread and apportion
the credit for the victory in such a way as to include others and other
factors, not just the USA and its various policies. It is the question
of producing evidence that is troubling. It is as though there is a
temporary amnesty to scholars who are self avowedly positivist, to
allow them to eschew positivist rigor and to issue the command: go
and find whatever evidence you can and bring it in, it will be
accepted.
The shades and details may differ but the “helpers” in the victory
the USA had are all liberal favorites. It is either the tremendously
contagious ideas of democracy, freedom etc., which when people taste,
or simply hear about it, they never get over. These ideas penetrated
the Soviet Union, goes the argument, in the détente years when
academic exchanges took place. Or, they simply “rubbed off” on the
Soviet elites as a result of interdependence and the “learning” which
it inevitably brings. Or, it was Mikhail Gorbachev himself who took
steps facilitating the US victory, either as a liberal reformer himself,
or simply as a rational leader. For some scholars he did it alone, for
others, there was pressure from local elites. Accordingly, argues Herman,
“new thinking” represents a “genuine reconceptualization of interests
grounded in new collective understandings about the dynamics of
world politics and in actors’ evolving identities.” The “turn in Soviet
international policy” he goes on, “was the product of cognitive evo-
lution and policy entrepreneurship by networks of Western-oriented
in-system reformers coincident with the coming to power of a leader-
ship committed to change and receptive to new ideas for solving the
country’s formidable problems.” Checkel seems to concur, putting
the role of reform and democratic ideas, and the “subversive” role of
US academics, into a “neorealist context”: changes in a state’s external
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environment create “windows of opportunity through which policy
entrepreneurs ...jump,” when the domestic institutional setting “affects
their ability to influence policy” (ibid.). “As structures weaken, [he
explains], access to policymaking increases ..., [thus] creat[ing] a greater
number of pathways for promoters of new ideas” (Checkel, 1997:7).
Who are these promoters? How do we measure their influence?
What exactly triggers an “ideational change?” Herman continues: liberal
specialists developed new understanding about cause-and-effect relation-
ships in international politics (274). The principles governing the
relations among the Western democracies and within those societies,
he goes on, were transmitted to Soviet reformers through the kind of
transnational contacts with Western, liberal-Left counterparts that
flourished in the 1970s and survived détente’s precipitous decline
(275). Out goes the objectivity of the academy, which hereby plays
the role of agent of influence, with the responsibility for subverting
one of the world’s superpowers as its contribution to world peace.
Wendt’s conclusion is less enthusiastically put and more sober.
His argument is more complicated but he is not that far from e some
cold war historians who, having regarded cold war to be a matter of
clashing ideas conclude that when Gorbachev “changed his mind”
cold war ended (Mueller, 1995). Wendt too gives almost full credit
for the victory of the USA in the cold war to the Soviets. The Soviets
won it for the USA. He argues that Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was
the policy that allowed the change from a competitive to a cooperative
security system. He covers his bets by saying that the existence of this
new cooperative relationship may still be in doubt, and may not last.
It developed, however, according to Wendt, in a four-stage process,
namely,
1. the breakdown of the consensus about identity commitments
inside the USSR resulting from the giving up of an aggressive
posture, and bolstered by reassurances from the West that it
would not attack the Soviet Union;
2. these changed ideas then led to rethinking the Soviet identity,
the discovery of “new selves” by the Russians, and the
recognition of how much the old selves fed the old com-
petitive structure;
3. then there followed “altercasting,” that is, the presentation of
the Soviet Union by Soviet elites (now with new identity) in
such a way so as to change the identity of the USA as well.
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This was accomplished by such actions as withdrawal from
Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, i.e. by reducing in turn the
US need to perceive the Soviets as a threat;
4. and finally the establishment of a firm intersubjective basis
between the US and USSR to their understanding of their
changed relationship.
Wendt returns to the “new thinking” in 1999. Gorbachev’s “new
thinking,” he argues, was
a deep conceptual reassessment of what the US-Soviet relationship “was”.
It was constitutive theorizing, at the lay level, and based on it the Soviets
were able to end, unilaterally and almost overnight, a conflict that seemed
like it had become set in stone. It may be that objective conditions were
such that the Soviets “had” to change their ideas about the Cold War,
but that does not change the fact in an important sense those ideas were
the Cold War, and as such changing them by definition changed the
reality. (374)
For, he argues, “reality is being caused by theory rather than vice-
versa.” (76) Thus he is quite right when he described his approach as
structural idealism, an inversion of the approach of the structural
realists whom he criticizes as those “wedded to the blind forces model
of intentional action”:
Certainly the economic and military pressures on the Soviet state were
a crucial impetus for change. However, a structural pressures theory alone
cannot explain the form the Soviet response took (ending the Cold War
rather than intensifying repression) or its timing (the material decline
had been going on for some time). And it also ignores the role that the
leadership’s realization that its own policies were part o the problem played
in conditioning that response. Structural conditions did not force self-
awareness on the Soviets. Soviet behavior changed because they redefined
their interest as a result of having looked at their existing desires and
beliefs self-critically. The reflective model of intentional explanation cap-
tures this process more naturally than the blind forces model. (p. 129)
And, this is how he explains the “reflective model:”
When social kinds are reified there is a clear distinction between subject
and object. However, there are occasions when collectives become aware
of the social kinds they are constituting and move to change them, in what
might be called a moment of “reflectivity”: for decades, for example, the
Soviet union treated the Cold War as a given. Then in the 1980s it engaged
in “New Thinking,” an important outcome of which was the realization
that aggressive foreign policies contributed to Western hostility, which
in turn forced the Soviets to engage in high levels of defense spending.
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By acting on that understanding to conciliate the West, the Gorbachev
regime virtually single-handedly ended the Cold War. In effect, if a social
kind can “know itself” then it may be able to recall its human author-
ship, transcend the subject-object distinction, and create new social
kinds. (Wendt p. 76)
Soviet new thinking he argues serves as an example that “even
states are capable of. . . thinking reflexively”. (374) It is also an example
of a situation in which, he argues, “deliberation can generate dramatic
“preference reversals” even while structural conditions remain cons-
tant”. And so “the cognitive and deliberative arguments may overlap.
The principles informing Soviet “Reason” were not wholly indepen-
dent of beliefs about the identity of the Soviet state, the feasibility of
certain actions, and even about right and wrong. Deliberation about
national interests takes place against the background of a shared national
security discourse, in other worlds, which may substantially affect its
content. (p. 129)
Relative to the amount published about “new thinking” at the time
of its occurrence the post cold war studies are very few, and often not
by former Sovietologists. Most are amazingly selective in choosing
the sources they cite (and mix). Nor are there any guidelines given
as to what type of evidence should or should not be brought to bear
and the standard positivist strictures are obviously set aside.
Except to pick up little snippets here and there this rather unposi-
tivist attitude is largely due to the reluctance to go “inside the USSR.”
Both neoliberal and mainstream constructivist abide by the strictures
of keeping domestic and international politics separate. Nor, despite
the stress on things ideational did they change the standard
Sovietological approach of treating the Soviets as if they were mute.
Reformers or not, therefore, Soviets are presumed not to talk. Their
words are not cited. They are described in our own terms. Remember,
even when they were reformists (according to the old Sovietologists)
they only “spoke ideology.” We can only quote them, even now, when
they speak like we do.
True enough, the Soviet Union is gone, and its case is used now
not by Sovietologists or post-Sovietologists but by theorists of IR, who
only want to demonstrate the validity of the emerging neoliberal and
constructivist frameworks for handling social change. Besides, many
of the authors are not Sovietologists by training or trade and nor is
their audience. Thus nobody picks up their mistakes (Herman, for
example, is simply wrong when he argues that “other central elements”
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of ““new thinking”” e.g., the relationship between peace and social-
ism, and between class values and “values common to all mankind,”
were the product of ongoing debate within the socialist bloc, Herman,
275.) Positivist standards would lead one to expect some documen-
tation would be offered, first, as to who were all these “new thinkers”
before attaching the label to some only, and without any explanation
as to why to them and not to others. By positivist standards it could
be expected that these authors would recognize and acknowledge
differences among their sources and minimally explain why they rely
on some sources (or their part only) and ignore the rest or other sources.
Not for the sake of further analysis of this particular historical
incident, but for future reference, I will now summarize the frame-
works which generated this discussion. The two approaches, neoins-
titutionalist liberalism and mainstream constructivism, appear to be
very different, which they must be, if they are alternative paradigms
that they are claimed to be.
Judging from the analysis of Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” diffe-
rences between the two approaches are substantively negligible. I concur
with Jennifer Sterling-Folker, that mainstream constructivism does
not offer a paradigmatic alternative to neoliberal institutionalism
(Sterling-Folker, 2000: 98) As she points out, both constructivists
and neoliberals are interested in much the same things as “potential
evidence. ” They share the same ontology and same epistemology
and they rely on the same post hoc explanations (p. 100). Both are
positivist and emphasize that their purpose is not to replace, let alone
discredit the mainstream approaches but to complement them. Thus
I agree that they are no more than complementary theories within the
larger framework of liberal IR theory (p. 100) She reaches this
conclusion mainly on the argument that both neoliberal institutionalists
and mainstream constructivists depend on the same mechanism of
functional, institutional efficiency in order to account for social change.
Let me, in conclusion of this section and for the record, summarize
the two frameworks side by side. (Table 1)
Like neorealists, neoliberals subscribe to the idea that states’ actions
are restricted by the overpowering “logic of anarchy,” but they concede
that institutions, namely organizations or patterns of recurrent relation-
ship, can also act as constraints, thus possibly modifying the material
constraints stressed by structural realists. Goldstein and Keohane argue
that ideas can become a significant independent variable, i.e. the factor
which may help to explain or predict the dependent variable, in this
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case foreign policy. International institutions, they argue, can trans-
form state identities and interests.
The framework offered by both aims at reducing the element of
unpredictability in the event that a state like the Soviet Union, follow-
ing a different logic from that of the neorealist “logic of anarchy,”
suspends the rigors of positivism. Both of these approaches set out to
correct the focus on material structures in the explanation of a state’s
foreign policy. Both agree that one also needs to examine ideational
factors in addition to those emphasized by neorealism, i.e. such material
forces as bipolarity, and other balance of power considerations, as
well as institutional developments, added by the neoinstitutionalist
mainstream theorists. Policy choices and behavior are constrained/
dictated by both these material and institutional factors. Most
authors begin with a declaration to this effect, namely that material
forces, by themselves, cannot account for actual policies. A new focus
is needed to ascertain how ideas, norms, rules, and learning affect
decision makers’ preferences and, ultimately, foreign policy outcomes.
Or, to use the neoliberal jargon, particular circumstances (both systemic
and domestic) create the foundation (scope conditions) for policy
change and the implementation of new ideas (Goldstein and Keohane,
1993:30). All of these authors seem to concur that material structures
coexist with social structures and that they both codetermine a state’s
behavior, thus opening up an avenue for the investigation of factors
previously excluded. Stressing the need to adopt an “institutional-
ideational” framework to account for foreign policy outcomes, Checkel
(1997:xi), for instance, examines the “interaction between ideas,
political institutions, and the international system,” to explain the
process through which ideas have shaped Soviet/Russian foreign policy.
The common denominator of these studies is the acknowledge-
ment that ideational factors, in addition to material ones, shape elite
preferences, interests, and policies. Hence the need to scrutinize the
exact relationship between these factors, that is, how structures and
institutions constrain foreign policy, but also how they leave a range
of choice (the possibility to articulate different policy paths), so that
ideological factors like beliefs, culture, or “historical narratives” need
to be looked at as well.
Table 1 enables me to skip the technical detail of the subtle diffe-
rences between the two approaches in theoretical terms. I compare
the two approaches, focusing on their similarities and differences. In
regard to their commitment to positivism, rational choice, the expla-
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nation of social change, the attention to domestic politics, and to
language, they do not differ. I mark in the middle of Table 1 the areas
where they differ, namely in regard to processing ideas, interests, iden-
tities etc. Constructivists of the Wendt variety are “reflective,” and
their argument goes deeper than that of neoliberals who simply place
ideas in the rational context tout court. To Wendt it is a more philo-
sophically erudite process, that is, for him the objective world becomes
intersubjectively available, and disciplined inquiry can make intersub-
jective understanding more reliable. His constructivism goes no further,
however. Thus it can be absorbed into the hegemonic discourse of
North American IR without undue discomfort on either side.
The conclusion reached by both neoliberal institutionalists and
mainstream constructivists seems to be counterintuitive. It also flies in
the face of the facts: the main beneficiaries of the collapsed Soviet
Union and its bumpy transition were from the beginning the former
Party officials in what is now an overwhelmingly corrupt and totally
bankrupt economic system, demodernized and returned to the standard
in the 19th century (Cohen, 2000). It takes a leap of faith to argue
with any degree of conviction that any Soviet leader would have agreed
on behalf of his country to plunge into the disarray characteristic of
the “transition” in which the former Soviet Union still finds itself.
Neither neoliberals nor constructivists have come with any other
suggestion, however.
Soviet “new thinking” and rule oriented constructivism
Rule oriented constructivism comes very naturally to a person who
studies, here in the West, the culture/religion/ideology from which
he/she hails. Or to a person who takes seriously the work of insiders
in the areas he/she studies. That in itself is a step in the direction of
acknowledging that the world is constructed differently in its different
parts. Studying Soviet pronouncements, as I have done, is a step in
the direction of recognizing that words matter. To those of us who
were “insiders” somewhere else before becoming “insiders” in the
US, constructivism is simply common sense, and need not be learned.
Positivism, in contrast, has to be learned and in my experience, the
learning is by no means easy.
To be a social scientist working in IR or in any other Western social
science means keeping one’s personal concerns, experiences and political
commitments very much to oneself, and certainly out of one’s work.
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Personal experience is suitable for writing memoirs or belles-lettres,
not for scholarship. Social scientists apply the same sanitized, dehu-
manized approach not only to themselves but also to their subject
matter, purging it of people. One way to achieve this is simply not
to study people but to study reifications instead, objects made up of
people that is. Another way is to observe their behavior. In both cases
the point is to forget that it is people, with their intentions and meanings
that are involved.
Objectivity, and the elimination of subjectivity, requires another
crucial step: imputing uniform, apriori, given, inescapable rationality,
either to every human being, American, Czech or Russian, or to every
reified institution made up of Americans, Czechs, or Russians. The
positivist scholar is taught to speak and write in the passive voice (or
to use the royal “we”). This is regarded as appropriate since the pursuit
of knowledge is scholarly, that is, objective, value free, and untainted
by any subjective biases.
Soviet “new thinking” from the “horse’s mouth”
I began collecting all Soviet sources as they were published, articles,
speeches and later also books, on the subject of new thinking. The
concept of new thinking crystallized in the first year of Gorbachev’s
tenure of office of General Secretary of the CPSU. In fact other authors,
high up in the Soviet hierarchy wrote on the subject first, before
Gorbachev took up the concept. There was confusion amongst the
Soviet decision-making elite as to what it was (Petrovsky). There must
have been concern that the Soviet population at large might not
understand it either. Thus Pravda published a series of political cartoons
putting it in clear and graphic terms for everybody to see. I carefully
tracked who were the writers on the subject in a flowchart of the Soviet
State and Party organization. I studied their biographies to discover
their professional/ intellectual/ educational backgrounds, to find out
whether they did or did not study outside the USSR, or what their
previous assignments were. I tried to read as many publications by
these authors as possible. This proved to be a daunting task: Georgi
Shakhnazarov, one of Gorbachev’s closest advisors, wrote more than
50 books, some under the nom de plume G. Shakh. I paid particular
attention to who these writers cited, and in particular who were their
Western sources of inspiration. I kept track of the personal changes
Gorbachev made to the leading state and party institutions by moving
22 E
THE TALE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIVISMS AT THE COLD WAR’S END
personnel and creating new bodies. I took careful note of the tasks
assigned to different research outfits and confirmed some of these
developments in discussions with Soviet defectors. I found it interest-
ing that Gorbachev’s wife Raisa was a professor of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, and had introduced her husband to a circle of her colleagues
and their philosophical discussions, which apparently he enjoyed.
Gorbachev elevated at least one of this circle beyond mere academic
status.
The duality of the “new thinking”’s sources
Right off the bat I found a little puzzle, however, namely the actual
words “new thinking.” Soviet authors stressed these tirelessly–and
equally tirelessly, their Western “watchers” ignored them. In the West,
as I came to argue, the meaning of the term “new thinking” was set
in terms of its antonym, “old thinking,” understood to be the old
Soviet, Marxist-Leninist, inflexible, aggressive, Brezhnevite type of
thinking. Gorbachev’s group acknowledged that they were trying to
depart from some of Brezhnev’s practices and from those of other
Soviet leaders. However, as Gorbachev and his team repeated, the
term “new thinking” was borrowed from Albert Einstein, who had
coined it for the Pugwash Peace movement. Specifically, it was used
for the manifesto written jointly for Pugwash by Einstein and
Bertrand Russell. “New thinking”’s antonym—the old thinking that
was to be supplanted by the “new thinking”—was not the Soviet
thinking. Rather, “new thinking” was to replace what we here in the
West call realist, state centric thinking, the Westphalian system that
Gorbachev agreed with Einstein, had become untenable (with its
reliance on the use of violence) in the nuclear era. The mainstream
realism we teach and propagate here in the West was, in this view,
tantamount to war propaganda and should be banned! Western
analysts could not possibly have missed the meaning the Soviets were
trying to convey with the term “new thinking.” “New thinking” was
not to be the Soviet thinking only but thinking of the entire humanity
in the nuclear age. However they chose to set it aside. The Western
analysts probably regarded it as not important enough to deserve
comment, however, or as thwarting the spin that they chose to put
on what “new thinking” meant.
There were many other differences between the Soviet meaning
and the Sovietological interpretation of “new thinking. ” Most of its
E 23
Vendulka KUBÁLKOVÁ
associated concepts, as I documented in detail, had a dual source, one
Soviet, one Western. I kept jotting them down as they emerged. I
also started collecting the work of Sovietologists on the subject, not
restricting myself to the US or English literature, but including also
German and Chinese authors. My reading of the Soviet texts led me
to the conclusion that the term “new thinking” had ten regular
conceptual associates. There were, in other words, ten aspects to Soviet
“new thinking,” and only the inclusion of all of them gave a clear
idea of what the Soviets meant. They were
1. the global problems of mankind, or “global human problems”
(nuclear catastrophe, ecological disaster, poverty, etc);
2. the interdependence for survival of mankind in a world
regarded as one interrelated totality;
3. the renunciation of war (there was therefore no such a thing
as a Soviet “threat”);
4. the concept of peace as the highest of humanity’s values;
5. the regarding of the security of all states as global and
indivisible;
6. the attainability of security not by military but political
means, not on the basis of the “balance of power” but of the
“balance of interests” in a comprehensive system of security;
7. the reduction in the level of military confrontation in all
areas;
8. the basing of the size of military arsenals on “reasonable
sufficiency” to repel aggression;
9. the stress on flexibility in IR so as to reflect the realistic assess-
ment of them;
10. the co-existence of socialism and capitalism in one interrelated
and interdependent world (where the mode of thought that
continued to distinguish socialism from capitalism was
Marxist-Leninist historical materialism based on dialectics).
Taken in isolation from each other this mixed bag of points and
ideas would have baffled many an analyst. Some authors thought
these points were mutually contradictory. Thus many authors picked
only one or two points and ignored the rest. A focus only on point
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9 for example, led to appreciation of a new approach/new style of
foreign policy. Points 5 – 9 suggested a new doctrine of national
security. Points 1 – 4 were usually listed by Sovietologists at the end
of any discussion of “new thinking” and dismissed as propaganda.
Points 5 – 8, taken in isolation, could be seen as indicating no more
than a fresh wave of rhetoric. Point 10 was seldom cited at all, and
if it was, then only to argue that it conflicted with the rest.
My interpretation was different I saw the ten points were just a
tip of an iceberg—a small part of a profoundly significant and far-
reaching intellectual/ideological change and reorientation. I interpreted
the ten points of Soviet “new thinking” as consisting of essentially of
four things:
1. a new Soviet ideology
2. a new form of Marxism
3. a new theory of IR
4. a new guide for foreign policy action.
My case rested on very shaky grounds by the standards of positivist
scholarship, however. I had first to prove the validity of my hypo-
thesis that Soviet new thinking pertained to these ten principles and
secondly that it originated from the pens of decision and policy-
making elites close to Gorbachev. My other “evidence” was based on
a comprehensive survey of all sources and a flowchart indicating the
location of authors of “new thinking” in the Soviet apparatus, however.
My evidence was a collection of cartoons from Pravda showing what
the Soviet elites wanted the Soviet population to associate with the
concept. My “evidence” included an “intersubjective consensus”
amongst a small handful of analysts, most of them from outside the
USA. It was not enough. Thus I was delighted to find that Glickham’s
analysis came close to mine, that some German analysts concurred
that new thinking was not a foreign policy expedient (Meissner, 1987:3)
or disinformation (Wettig, 1987a 144) that like me, two other German
scholars also thought that new thinking was “a grand theory”
(Grosskonzeption) (Berner and Dahm, 1987, 5), and that Chinese
analysts concurred that new thinking was a formal repudiation of Lenin’s
theory of imperialism positivist rules of evidence were not met. I cited
for support some American Sovietologists who agreed that Gorbachev
could not have been a closet democratic reformer because he under-
stood by “democracy” something very different from the idea of it
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impute to him. Gorbachev meant by democracy at best grass roots
democracy at the micro societal level, that is, free elections at the
enterprise, primary party organization, and local soviet level—but not
at the macro institutional level, which included state and party
organs. (Bialer, 1987 64) Another commentator pointed out that the
“democratization” of the interstices of the party advocated by Gorbachev,
which some western observers mistook for a genuine wish to demo-
cratize the entire Soviet society, excluded non-members of the party.
It meant no more than democratization of the rule by whites in South
Africa, that is, which did not affect apartheid in any way and which
maintained the policy of excluding black voters (Handleman 1987,
33) None of this was evidence that satisfied the positivist consensus
either. Until constructivists took it out of the mothballs Soviet “new
thinking” had ceased to exist, and the debate about it was closed.
Rule oriented constructivist interpretation
I should stress right at the outset that there are two ways a constructivist
can proceed: either going for the big picture or its fragment. As we
have pointed out before (Kubálková, Onuf, Kowert, 1998) construct-
ivism presents a picture of social reality of enormous complexity. That
does not rule out the possibility of “zooming” in on one or more
aspects of this complex picture, however. It is this possibility
Koslowski and Kratochwil pursued in their 1996 study, the first ever
rule oriented constructivist interpretation of an aspect of Soviet “new
thinking” (Koslowski, Kratochwil, 1996—also a footnote). In it the
authors singled out one rule, the Soviet Internationalism, a. k. a. the
Brezhnev doctrine and shown just how a change in one rule affected
the entire system. I fully agree with the conclusions they came to.
However, by comparing the range of approaches to “new thinking”
in this paper, I have committed myself to a somewhat broader, option.
Even so I limit myself to a particular aspect of the Soviet society, to
do mainly with the understanding of Gorbachev as agent and the social
structure from which he arose, in order to discuss his rationality.
Limited space precludes my doing justice to it, but I hope to be able
to go far enough here to make my interpretation of “new thinking”
a convincing one. I refer a reader to my larger study on the subject
(1989a) and a reader interested in constructivism of the rule oriented
variety to Onuf 1989 or Kubálkova et al 1998 or Kubálkova 2001.
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Constructivism has nothing to say directly about “new thinking”
per se or about Gorbachev. What it does do is direct our research to
certain areas of social relations. A positivist scholar would only reluct-
antly consider the material I have just summarized in the previous
section. This, though, is the starting point for rule-oriented cons-
tructivists. It is the preliminary to what in Chapter 3 (2001 forth-
coming) I called Step 3. Constructivism’s first concern is to find “rules”,
understood here as a crucial form of human and social activity that
enables us to see people as interacting in, and with, an inextricably social
and material world. Thus while “ideology” or “propaganda” are not
regarded by positivists as admissible evidence, to constructivists they
contain rules, and these rules need to be sorted out not only in terms
of their relation to agents and to structure, but also by their type (ins-
tructive, directive, and commissive). This particular categorization
offers additional insight into other, non-linguistic aspects of the social
world as well again, space precludes me pursuing further this line of
enquiry.
Soviet ideology
In my earlier work I argued against the point blank dismissal of Soviet
ideology. I argued that Soviet ideology ought not to be viewed as
amorphous or homogeneous, but rather as consisting of a highly
structured body of ideas whose various roles were played out with
respect to their overall position within a whole ideological framework.
To simplify the argument, that framework can be represented in pyra-
midal form, with different ideas corresponding to different levels of
the pyramid (Kubálkova and Cruickshank, 1985, 1989, 71ff, 1989a
15ff).
The ideas at the apex always performed a largely rhetorical, cere-
monial, propagandist, and legitimizing role, whilst also acting as the
binding agent for the whole structure. This function remained
unchanged throughout Soviet history. But the pyramid had other levels
that performed other roles. As the axiomatic value of all levels declin-
ed, the heuristic potential of the pyramid’s lower levels rose, and the
number of elements open to debate and research increased.
There had always existed a degree of mobility and flexibility in
the pyramidal structure, as old axioms were opened up for debate, or
as ideas developed by those whose research was more unconstrained
began percolating upwards. This is not to deny that change was a rare
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and painful process, which had to wait years to be officially promul-
gated, usually from the platform of Congresses of the CPSU. More
than 5,000 delegates attended congresses. They did not lend them-
selves to anything other than announcements. In the welter of largely
ceremonial speeches major doctrinal change could easily get lost, such
as the change that took place under Gorbachev’s leadership at the
27th CPSU Congress in 1986. This, incidentally, was a change that
Western Sovietologists mostly missed.
The main idea at the ideological apex was that of communism as
the “future of mankind.” The definition of communism played a central
role in the rituals and symbolic ceremonial practices of the Soviet
regime. It was crucial to any understanding of the other parts of Soviet
ideology, for two reasons at least. Firstly, the notion that communism
was the future of mankind took the form of an assertive rule that
required acceptance on faith. The Soviets argued that historical
materialism allowed them to predict “scientifically” that communism
was the future of humanity. They saw their predictions as being based
upon a scientific understanding of the past and as a scientific projection
of the pattern that historical materialism had uncovered onto future.
At the same time, however, communism was not just a social goal.
Following Lenin’s definition in 1920, it was an ethical and moral
standard for the world as well.
These ideas about communism formed the core of Soviet Marxist
Leninist ideology, remaining largely unchanged after 1917, and
indeed being largely unchangeable, having been lifted virtually
verbatim from the work of Karl Marx. They were used to show how
in the Soviet way of thinking the normative and the descriptive were
one. The ideas concerning communism were also unconfirmable and
unfalsifiable, however. They were more akin to articles of faith, and
generation after generation accepted these notions on faith. If they
had changed, the entire system would have become something else,
as was borne out in due course when these notions were changed.
In my constructivist reading these ideas took the form of instruc-
tive rules that made the form of Soviet rule predominantly hegemonic.
(see Table 3. 4, 2001, forthcoming). Soviet ideology had a strong
moral component and its instructive rules were unusually strong as a
consequence. Its hegemonic character was that of a secular religion.
This character was modified, but was not completely lost, by coercive
sanctions in the form of directive rules, meted out to those who did
not comply with the “faith.” The goal was to fully internalize the
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instructive rules whereby Soviet Marxism-Leninism was presented,
though it never quite worked out like that, despite the decreeing of
a “moral code” for “builder[s] of communism” in 1960, for example,
the Soviet equivalent of the “ten commandments.”
The second important role the core Marxist-Leninist ideas played
was a legitimizing one. Since its inception, Soviet ideology had been
for the Soviet Union what democratic processes and elections are for
Western democracies today, or what filial relations are for monarchies.
The Soviet system’s legitimacy was based on what was deemed the
“superior” way of thinking that Marx thought only the proletariat (and
with Lenin, the proletariat under the guidance of the Bolsheviks) was
capable of. The leadership of the Communist Party, in other words,
had its epistemological roots deep in Marx’s ideas about private property
as alienating those who owned it and as impairing their ability to
think in an undistorted way.
The importance, from my point of view, of this second aspect of
Marxist dogma is that, together with the relevant practices, it became
part of the social structure called the Soviet Union
Gorbachev’s social structure
Gorbachev inherited this social structure, that which Onuf prefers to
call a social arrangement and his agency was defined in these terms.
Gorbachev was not answerable or accountable to the people as he would
have been if the USSR were a democratic state. Instead he and the
Party were vested with a superior way of knowing and could always
be paternalistic towards the people, who needed to be lead and guided.
Like the priesthood in religious societies, the Communist Party, the
agent here, was entrusted “by history” with the task of leading the
society along the path of transformation to communism, as defined
in terms of the negation of all the injustices and inequalities capitalism
wrought, and above all, the abolition of private property.
The social structure of which Gorbachev was the agent also contain-
ed cumbersome and inefficient political and economic institutions,
however. The latter in particular, despite incessant attempts to reform
them, were incapable of providing food for the Soviet population in
most years. This social structure provided the main constraints on
Gorbachev when he took over from his predecessors. As an agent, as
a human being, with the ability to choose and to act on his choices,
Gorbachev gave the structure a dynamic social element. He as agent
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gave it an intentionality, and meaning. He could not just “jump out”
of the social arrangement he inherited, however, because in rule-
oriented constructivist terms, the rules of that arrangement made him
a part of it. The social structure represented the full range of values
and principles, the recurrent patterns of social behavior, and the ins-
titutions and practices, which weighed him down. He sought to make
his choices under this weight. It was this structure and not some abstract
apriori notion—as formulated by Western rational choice principles,
for example—which defined for him the nature of his agency, as well
as what might constitute the meaning of rationality and rational action
on his part. As agent he was separate from the structure but the
structure dominated his ability to act and in fact, it demanded that
he act. The structure also set, on its own behalf, the range that
Gorbachev’s rational choices could enjoy.
Gorbachev never conceded that the goal of his society and humanity
was not communism. Figuring out how to achieve this goal legiti-
mized his position as an agent. Moreover, Gorbachev never stopped
reiterating his commitment to this goal. Nor did he ever sign off on
any document that used the term “private property,” a term that directly
negated the concept of communism. A constructivist understands
Gorbachev’s position perfectly well: what was or was not rational for
him was determined by the structure in which he was embedded, and
not by some apriori quasi natural law.
A society whose apex derives its legitimacy from its relations with
other layers provides an equally revealing example of constructivism
at work. In the Soviet case, the further down towards the base of the
pyramid we move, the more numerous the rules become, and the more
flexible and changeable are the strategies and policies they contain
(always allowing for consistency with the layers below and above).
Occasionally the changes taking place in rules on lower levels percolated
up. There was the switch from the “socialism in one country strategy”
to “peaceful coexistence,’ for example, that Khrushchev inaugurated
in 1956. Building on reforms of Khrushchev, Gorbachev’s reforms
were bold and far-reaching. They stopped short of the pyramid’s apex,
however.
He had to make changes to preserve the social structure. “New
thinking” represented changes on behalf of a crippled Soviet super-
power that was casting around to survive, let alone remain on the
“one true path.” It was a daunting task, not only because of the
pitiful condition of the Soviet society and economic system but
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because as agent, Gorbachev wore multiple hats. Gorbachev was agent
in a multitude of social arrangements; his public statements were
addressed simultaneously to a range of constituencies; to the Soviet
population, to the communist Party, to his internal foes, to the inter-
national community, to Western governments, to Western popula-
tions, and to the US administration. Holding supreme agency in the
social structure of the Soviet Union and wielding supreme influence
through the speech acts and rules, he embodied a number of
overlapping social arrangements. The same words conveyed different
messages to these different social arrangements, or it was the same
message, but it was to serve different rules for different hearers. Some-
times this resulted in misunderstandings. “Glasnost” for example, was
intended as a rule addressed to the Soviet work force to overcome
alcoholism related absenteeism, to improve working morale and to
raise workplace standards. This was to be achieved by encouraging
people to “voice” complaints concerning their co-workers and manage-
ment. This in turn was to improve performance standards in the
workforce. When this rule was intercepted in the West it was promptly
translated in English, somewhat inaccurately, as “openness,” and
taken—quite mistakenly—as an early indication of democratization
taking place in the entire Soviet society.
Western observers saw the Soviet superpower as being constrained
by the bipolar structure of the cold war. This structure, they believed,
allowed Gorbachev to make only certain moves. This missed a large
part of the picture, by setting aside the multiple contexts that Gorbachev
represented. Space precludes me from developing this line of argu-
ment but it is clear that the stress on this or that social structure of
which he was an agent, notable in terms of who he was addressing
first and foremost at the time, kept changing. In my opinion the
tremendous popularity which he received in the West led him to
place greater stress on his role as international agent, to the detriment
of the other contexts of which he was an agent and which he should
have tried to reconcile in terms of rules and speech acts that he made.
The concept of “new thinking” holds the key to understanding the
rescue strategy he devised on behalf of the Soviet superpower.
The “breakthrough”
Gorbachev certainly made enough noises on this subject to dispel any
notion that “new thinking” was just a label. He stressed that “new
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thinking” was neither his brainchild nor a product of glasnost. Nor
was it a product of free debate amongst Soviet foreign policy specialists.
It was not “hastily put together,” the “fruit of improvisation.” It was,
he argued, “profoundly considered and nurtured” (Pravda, 9 Dec
1988). None of these comments make sense if “new thinking” was
what it was taken to be in the West, however.
Gorbachev realized no doubt the tremendously difficult situation
in which he found himself and mindful of the central Marxist notion
of the unity of theory and practice, he obviously felt the importance
of thinking one’s way out of practical problems. In his own words,
Gorbachev hazarded all hopes and the future of his country on
making a “theoretical breakthrough.” In his view “new thinking” was
this theoretical breakthrough.
It is at this point that the utility of my textual analysis of “new
thinking” might become apparent. In making this analysis I made a
list of ten points. I did not try and decide which one did or did not
merit being included, based on my own rational evaluation rather
than Gorbachev’s. I did this consistently with constructivist argument
that what was or was not “rational” to him was not to be found in
Western texts but in his own social structure. That said, it should come
as no great surprise that “new thinking,” particularly given the stress
on point 10 (p. ) was cast in Marxist terms. Gorbachev knew nothing
other, or very little other, than Marxism of the Soviet variety. It takes
a very large leap of faith to postulate that Western democratic liberal
principles are somehow primordial, and were therefore known to him
personally, or that he learned them from his relatively brief exposure
to them overseas, and subsequently allowed them to override or
supplant his lifelong commitment to and knowledge of Marxism. I
would argue, as a consequence, that the historical parallels drawn in
the West between Gorbachev and Woodrow Wilson, Olaf Palme, and
Willy Brandt, were quite erroneous.
Almost nobody in the West thought of seeing Gorbachev as
borrowing from Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about “counter-hegemonic”
strategies. The German Sovietologists Berner and Dahm, who did
note the unmistakable Gramscian element in Gorbachev’s ideas, trace
these influences to that of Soviet apparatchiks assigned to the Commu-
nist parties of France and Italy during the (also Gramscian inspired)
Eurocommunist years. (Berner and Dahm, 1987). The formal rehabi-
litation of Gramsci at this time, who had hitherto been viewed in the
Soviet Union with suspicion for contradicting Lenin and for being
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too popular in the West, is indicative in this regard. Gramsci’s popu-
larity in the West ceased to matter under Gorbachev and Gramsci was
effectively rehabilitated in the 1980s. His work was translated into
Russian, with introductions that stressed its consistency with that of
Lenin. My discussions with Soviet defectors have confirmed that
work on Gramsci was commissioned in these years in various Soviet
think tanks, together with the works of, for example, Jurgen Habermas
and the Frankfurt School. It is when considered as a form of Marxism
that the extraordinary array of Gorbachev’s initiatives begins to fall in
place.
In noting the connection with Gramsci, and the use of the concept
of counter-hegemony, I am not trying to suggest that Gramsci’s
Prison Notebooks were Gorbachev’s blueprint for saving the Soviet
Union. It is important, however, to stress that in the annals of Marxism
there did exist a Marxist strategy for dealing with Marxism under
duress, and that it makes sense to think that Gorbachev would have
availed himself of this strategy’s arguments and example. In devising
a strategy for Marxists in a weak and defeated situation Gramsci thought
that there was a Marxist way to move from the traditional emphasis
on overtly coercive class struggles to an emphasis on culture and
consciousness instead, and the molding of consensus along lines set
by a “historical bloc” of intellectuals. The parallels with Gorbachev’s
“new thinking” are arguably too obvious to miss.
Gramsci’s work, produced in a fascist jail, contained an explanation
as to why Bolshevik style revolution did not/could not work in
Western Europe in the 1920s. He argued that the approach so success-
fully adopted by Bolsheviks in their October revolution in Russia in
1917, which he called a “war of position,” was condemned to fail in
the context in which he lived. As a result he advocated a much more
subtle approach, one that combated capitalism using the same
mechanisms by which capitalism in Western Europe had established
itself, and by which it had made itself immune to the Bolshevik
penchant for “going for the jugular”. Gramsci suggested a counter-
hegemonic strategy instead, one which—once again—was Janus faced
and looked a bit like a social democratic/liberal compromise, but was
nothing of the sort. He offered an array of methods to penetrate and
conquer the “civil society” which—according to Gramsci—was the
factor which had so much strengthened capitalism in Europe in the
1920s. In order to break the hegemonic rule of capitalism, Gramsci
believed it was necessary to use the same methods by which civil
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society itself worked. It was necessary to penetrate (and subvert) its
activities, and particularly those of the educational and religious bodies
it contained. This was the only method by which capitalism could be
conquered. We advanced this thought as a possible Marxist strategy
before the adoption of new thinking when we emphasized Gramsci’s
prescient counsel in regard to the shift from the “war of position” to
what he called a “war of maneuver and ‘counter-hegemony’...” the
only agency he believed to be capable of “restructuring the states-
system [as] the Machiavellian Centaur, a mix of coercion and consent,
of authority and hegemony, violence and civilization”(1985 and 1989,
203-4).
Let us re-read, in these counter-hegemonic terms, the ten points
I identified as summarizing Soviet “new thinking.” There is, first of
all, the apparently meaningless reference to “world society.” Here
Gorbachev added—after a complicated debate on the subject in the
USSR regarding the compatibility of global and class issues—another
“hat” as agent of yet another social structure to the multitude that
he already occupied. Global issues were found to be prior to class issues
at humanity’s present stage, and by stressing these global problems
Gorbachev began talking to humanity as a whole, or rather, began
talking to what Hedley Bull, for example, understood to be “world
society.” The Soviets actually used the term “world society,” and it
is more than likely that they were familiar with its Western usage. I
have no reason to believe that they did not follow with great interest
Western theories of International Relations: the reason I initially myself
came to the West was to study IR theory to see whether it is or it
is not compatible with historical materialism. The only difference in
the Soviet understanding of world society was that rather than seeing
the world bound together in positive terms and by positive values
held in common, values that Bull thought were going to be those of
modernity, Gorbachev talked in negative terms about the miscellaneous
forces threatening the existence of humanity on this planet (see point
1). He saw these global problems as binding humanity into a world
society in which the state system and its attendant “old thinking,” i.e.
Western realism, were rendered obsolete and were downright
dangerous, even fatally so.
It is at this point that the relevance of Gorbachev’s renunciation
of Lenin’s theory of imperialism also came in. If Lenin’s theory of
imperialism—as I argued earlier, in a deliberately simplified way—
“ideologized” international relations by vesting states with an ideolo-
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gical mission, now the time came to “deideologize” IR. Sovietologists,
in my view, took this expression out of context when they took it to
mean that the USSR gave up its ideology and its aggressive posture.
Hence the significance of the one sentence from the thousands of
pages of documents coming from the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986
(and missed by the Soviet watchers) that said that the “peaceful
coexistence of states of different socio economic nature was no longer
a form of class struggle.”
Using Einstein’s dictum that the nuclear age needed “new think-
ing,” Gorbachev tried to reverse the order of the goals set for him by
the Marxist principles that informed the social structure in which he
lived. Class struggle was always supposed to be the first priority for
the proletariat and for the Soviet state, largely because it was assumed
that states and the system of states would inevitably collapse once the
class structure of Western societies was smashed. Gorbachev reinter-
preted historical materialism (removing the Leninist component from
the Soviet social structure in the process). He argued that in the light
of the global problems threatening humanity’s existence, world society
had assumed a greater significance than the class struggle, which he then
put in second place. Instead, Gorbachev concluded that the major threat
to humanity was the further existence of the states system, with the
grant it gave to sovereign states of the legitimate use of violence. Thus
in addition to being a Gramscian form of Marxism, “new thinking”
was also a theory of international relations which declared the state
system to have been effectively superceded by world society. The
Soviets tirelessly stressed that they did not any longer mean to be a
threat to others. They proposed a reduction in armaments, changes
in their strategic doctrine, and eventually complete disarmament, as
a way of effectively abolishing the ultima ratio regnum of the West-
phalian system, with its sovereign states and the legitimacy it gave to
the use of violence in IR.
It is at this point that the duality of the sources of Soviet “new
thinking,” an innovation unprecedented in the history of Soviet
Marxism-Leninism, begins to make sense. In the context of world
society “new thinking” was not simply Soviet “new thinking” but
“new thinking” was thinking about and of humanity as a whole.
Gorbachev’s best-selling in the West book conveyed this in its title:
“Perestroika and new thinking for our country and the world”
(Gorbachev, 198). The authors of “new thinking” were not just Soviets,
but also the Western intellectual elites from whom Gorbachev had
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borrowed not only the label “new thinking”, but also most of its
content. “New thinking” was the thinking of what Gramsci called the
transnational “historical bloc.” It was ostensibly shared by both
Soviet and Western intellectuals. This was the breakthrough. The
initiative taken by Gorbachev, needless to say, granted him a moral
platform from which, despite the weakness of the Soviet superpower,
he could espouse a continuing role for it, defined now not in military
or economic terms, but in moral terms instead. This was another
innovation. Instead of balancing power, the Soviets proposed to balance
only interests, another point of the “new thinking. “
Just as it had proved for the Italian CP in the 1930s, the Gramscian
model appeared to be the only sensible option for the Soviet Union
given the circumstances in the USSR at the time. It was the only way
that a weak and failing superpower, with nothing but military muscle
to support its geopolitical gains, could go. Gramscian theory moved
the issue of conflict and confrontation beyond the power realist pro-
motion of force and the threat of force. It also moved it beyond the
usual Western understanding of Soviet propaganda, however. It
represented a shift from Gramsci’s war of maneuver to a war of position,
the former ultimately assuming invasion and occupation (and being
very expensive), the latter targeting societies in their “homes” (and
being much less profligate). Thus it is quite correct to say that
Gorbachev single-handedly dismantled the cold war structure, as
Wendt noted. It is also possible to see why it was in his interest to
abolish the Socialist Internationalist (Brezhnev) doctrine, as noted by
Kratochwil and Kozlowski (1966) and to set free, in some cases by
force, the East European satellites as a way of making more credible
his plans to move into “our common European home” a post-terri-
torial notion reminiscent of Deutsch’s security community idea.
Gorbachev never tired of stressing that his wish was not to dis-
sociate himself from his Marxist predecessors or to give up Marxism
as the Soviet state ideology. If the Brezhnev line was unMarxist, and
a Marxist aberration—as Western Marxist agree—then this was a Marxist
renaissance. There was very little of orthodox class or economic
determinism in new thinking but that in itself, as Western Marxism
bears out, was no proof of the Soviets giving up Marxism. It can be
seen instead as an attempt to bring the Soviet variant of Marxism
back from its “barrack version” (as Gorbachev called Soviet Marxism-
Leninism), towards the Marxism of its estranged Western cousins.
36 E
THE TALE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIVISMS AT THE COLD WAR’S END
My answer, then, to the question regarding the significance of
Soviet “new thinking” and the end of the Cold War is this: the collapse
of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of the social structure
called the Soviet Union, were unintended consequences of rational
choices that Gorbachev made (because of the complexity and multi-
plicity of the social arrangements he presided over) in the wrong
order or too late. Although he was working on his “new thinking”
from the beginning of his agency he was far too slow in that area of
his structure that was notoriously weak, namely, the area of nationalities.
He had to change the rules for the Soviet federation from directive
to commissive ones, dissolve the existing arrangement and allow all
Soviet republic to sign a confederative or federative treaty. He planned
to do so, but he ran out of time. He left totally unprepared his other
constituency, the Soviet population at large. He failed even to begin
to change the rules that governed the everyday activities of the popu-
lation. These were firmly embedded in the existing social structure.
Without the support of the commissive rules the changing relation-
ship with Western countries provided, he could not implement domestic
alternatives. In my view, this is what left the living legacy (and night-
mare) of that social structure, which survives in the successor states
everywhere in the former Soviet bloc lending itself to the worst pos-
sible abuse in what an increasing number of even Western observers
see as a total failure of any transition to a western political and econo-
mic model (Cohen, 2000).
To a constructivist the suggestion that Gorbachev was a closet
democrat who wanted to reform the Soviet Union and make it a replica
of a Western capitalist democratic state, or to give up Marxism in
order not to lose the Soviet state’s status as a superpower, makes no
sense. The main role of rule-oriented constructivism is not to decry
Western triumphalism. The Soviet state is indeed gone, and this no
doubt deserves celebration. What rule-oriented constructivism does
do is decry the enthusiasm exhibited by the “add on,” fragmentary,
and misleading explanations I surveyed earlier in this paper, however.
The world is full of other societies whose structures give its agents
different kinds of rationality and which might well produce surprises
in the future. We were lucky that the Soviet superpower collapsed
due mainly to the unintended consequences of a range of policies
implementing Soviet “new thinking.” Some voices in the West begin
to claim that the rest of the world is still to get to feel these unintended
consequences when it is fully appreciated that our policies vis a vis the
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Soviet Union and its successor states have been a failure. Whatever
happens, next time we may not be so lucky. IR scholars ought to
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